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Abstract 
People are usually overconfident in their expectations of 
what they can do. The term used to describe the extent 
which people are accurate in these self-assessments is 
“calibration”. The present study focused on the effects of 
feedback and expertise on calibration in the physical task of 
serving in tennis, and three cognitive tests related to tennis. 
Sixty-four male and female tennis players, ranging in 
ability level from social to professional, took part in the 
study. Participants completed a tennis rules test, a tennis 
general knowledge test, and a tennis technique test, along 
with confidence ratings regarding their answers. They then 
completed two trials of two tennis serving tasks, which also 
involved estimating their expected performance on each 
trial. The results indicated that participants were 
overconfident on the general knowledge test, the rules test, 
and the more difficult serving task, but well calibrated on 
the technique test, and the easier serving task. Expertise 
was not strongly related to calibration and feedback was not 
beneficial for the more difficult serving task. The results 
have implications for decision making in tennis players, 
especially in relation to the tendency towards 
overconfidence on difficult tasks. 
Introduction 
The ability to monitor past performance and predict 
future performance is an important part of day-to-day 
life. People use beliefs about their own abilities to 
help judge performance. Because these beliefs often 
do not match objective performance, they can lead to 
performance judgments that do not relate to real 
accomplishment (Dunning, Johnson, & Ehrlinger, 
2003). The ability to be realistic when rating previous 
performance and making future probability 
judgments, often referred to as being “well 
calibrated”, has been shown to have  benefits in areas 
such as motivation and goal setting (Horgan, 1992).  
In the cognitive domain, where much of the 
calibration research has been conducted, simple 
techniques are used to assess calibration. Participants 
usually answer knowledge-related questions and then 
indicate how confident they are that their answer was 
correct in percentage terms (Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 
1977). When all questions are completed, the bias 
score can be obtained by subtracting the percentage 
of correct responses from the average confidence 
rating. If the proportion of correct responses 
corresponds with the average confidence rating, the 
subject is well calibrated. A positive bias score 
indicates overconfidence, while a negative bias score 
indicates underconfidence. Research using the 
calibration paradigm to judge metacognitive bias in 
the sporting domain normally varies from calibration 
testing in the cognitive domain, in that subjects are 
immediately aware of their result in physical tasks. 
Therefore, performance predictions are made before a 
block of attempts, rather than after.  
Studies in calibration have found that people are 
generally overconfident when predicting their own 
performance. In the domain of motor skills, Cohen, 
Dearnaley, and Hansel (1956) found that when bus 
drivers were asked to judge whether they could drive 
through a narrow gap, they were generally 
overconfident and more experienced drivers were not 
any better calibrated than less experienced drivers. 
West and Stanovich (1997) also found 
overconfidence when participants completed a penny 
slide task on a table top, and although  calibration 
improved on a second trial, significant 
overconfidence remained. 
Calibration studies of actual physical performance 
in sport are hard to find. Jagacinski, Isaac, and Burke 
(1977) tested the ability of college-level and 
professional basketball players to take uncontested 
shots from different positions in the court. Before 
they took the shot, both the player and a passive 
observer predicted if the shot would be made. No 
evidence was found that the players were more 
accurate than the observers, and both were 
overconfident in their predictions even when there 
were penalties for poor predictions. McGraw, 
Mellers, and Ritov (2004) measured the confidence 
that recreational basketball players felt while making 
shots and the pleasure they felt with the results of 
those shots. They also found that most players were 
overconfident, and those who were more 
overconfident experienced less enjoyment.  
Fogarty and Else (2005) used the calibration 
paradigm to measure metacognitive bias in 54 male 
golfers ranging in age from 13 to 75. Golfers were 
required to complete a putting task and a chipping 
task after first estimating how well they would 
perform on each of the tasks. Each exercise was 
repeated once. Results indicated that golfers tended to 
be reasonably well calibrated on the putting task but 
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slightly overconfident on the chipping task. 
Participants were also overconfident on the golf rules 
test, which is consistent with other cognitive 
calibration research.  
This research was extended by Graham (2006) 
when he studied 137 junior golfers who gave 
estimates of their ability on putting, chipping, and 
pitching tasks before completing the physical tests. 
Two experiments were conducted. Experiment 1, 
which required players to putt and chip to the shortest 
target, revealed good calibration whereas experiment 
2, which required players to chip and pitch at a more 
difficult target, revealed overconfidence.  
Summarising these findings, it appears that 
overconfidence generally exists in the cognitive 
domain, while in physical tasks and sport, the limited 
research suggests that people vary from good 
calibration to overconfidence. In relation to the 
present study of metacognition in the sport of tennis, 
it was therefore hypothesised (H1) that 
overconfidence would be displayed on a test of tennis 
rules, a test of tennis technique, a test of tennis 
general knowledge, and on two tennis serving tasks. 
The findings relating to expertise are less clear, 
but researchers have generally found that expertise 
does lead to better calibration. Keren (1987) found 
that expert bridge players were well calibrated when 
predicting the chances of a final contract being 
reached whereas amateurs were overconfident. 
Horgan (1992) found that better chess players were 
well calibrated, whereas players with lower ratings 
were overconfident. Toward (1997) split 24 female 
undergraduate basketball players into expert and 
novice groups where classification was based on how 
many seasons of competitive basketball members had 
played.  He tested the relationship between action and 
cognition in the basketball foul shot, and found that 
experts monitored and predicted outcomes better than 
novices. Against this trend, Fogarty and Else (2005) 
found no evidence to suggest that lower handicap 
golfers were better calibrated on chipping and putting 
than high handicap golfers. Despite this last finding, 
the weight of evidence suggests that calibration and 
expertise are associated. It was therefore 
hypothesised (H2) that expert tennis players would 
display better calibration on a serving task than non-
experts.  
The final variable examined in this study was 
feedback, where again the available evidence 
suggests an effect provided certain conditions are 
met. Keren (1987) suggested that the accuracy of 
calibration depends on the similarity of the mental 
processes necessary for repeated probability 
assessments. When task items are similar and 
sufficient practice has occurred, he argued that it is 
feasible to develop procedures that can lead to 
accurate predictions. Keren also suggested that 
immediate, relevant feedback is imperative for good 
calibration. In the domain of general knowledge, 
Pulford and Colman (1997) found that feedback is 
only effective in improving calibration for hard 
questions. Kruger and Dunning (1999) found that in 
comparison to their more competent peers, 
incompetent subjects were less able to use feedback 
to adjust calibration. Fischer and Budescu (2005) 
found that when testing categorical decision making, 
learning depends on the type of feedback given.  
The ability of athletes to learn from feedback 
when completing physical tasks is critical for success 
in sport. Fogarty and Else (2005) found improvement 
in calibration of putting and chipping in golf when 
using only two trial blocks. Graham (2006), also 
working in the sport of golf, found that players who 
were initially poorly calibrated used feedback from 
earlier trials to become better calibrated. On the basis 
of these findings, it was therefore hypothesised (H3) 
that calibration would improve on a tennis serving 
task where feedback is immediate and complete. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four tennis players ranging in age from 14 
to 48 years (M = 20.63, SD = 6.97) were recruited 
through personal contact in Cairns, the Sunshine 
Coast, Brisbane, and the Gold Coast to take part in 
calibration tests. Players were selected based on 
variation in expertise and gender. There were 41 male 
and 23 female players. Participants included current 
and former professional players, social adult players, 
and tournament standard junior players. Current and 
former professional players were defined as experts 
(n = 25), and juniors and social players were defined 
as non-experts (n = 39) for the expertise analyses. 
Participants were also ranked according to expertise 
by a representative from Tennis Queensland as a 
cross reference for these groupings.  
Instruments 
Test of tennis rules. Fifteen multiple-choice questions 
were designed to test calibration in knowledge of 
tennis rules (e.g., What is the ruling if during doubles 
a player receives out of turn?). Participants were 
asked to circle the correct answer. They were then 
asked to indicate how confident they were that their 
answer was correct by selecting a confidence rating 
for each question in percentage terms (25%, 50%, 
75%, or 100%). Three scores were attained from this 
test: Tennis Rules Confidence Rating, Tennis Rules 
Correct Answers (converted to a percentage), and 
Tennis Rules Bias Score, the Bias score being the 
difference between predicted and obtained scores, 
where positive scores suggest overconfidence and 
negative scores suggest underconfidence.  
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Test of tennis general knowledge. Fifteen multiple-
choice questions were designed to test calibration in 
knowledge of tennis general knowledge (e.g., Which 
year did Pat Cash win Wimbledon?). The same 
procedure was followed as for the test of tennis rules 
giving a further three measures: General Knowledge 
Confidence Rating, General Knowledge Correct 
Answers (converted to a percentage), and General 
Knowledge Bias Score. 
Test of tennis technique.  Fifteen multiple-choice 
questions were designed to test calibration in 
knowledge of tennis technique (e.g., Which grip 
would most advanced players use for a smash?). The 
same procedure was followed as for the previous tests 
giving a further three measures: Technique 
Confidence Rating, Technique Correct Answers 
(converted to a percentage), and Technique Bias 
Score.  
Serving task 1. Participants were required to hit 10 
first serves on a tennis court into a target area that 
measured one-quarter of the service box. Participants 
were allowed five warm up serves before the 
instructions were explained. They were then asked to 
estimate how many first serves out of the 10 they 
could hit into the target area. Instructions emphasized 
that the first serves were to be hit like they would in a 
real match, and the estimate was to be a realistic 
estimate of their actual score and not what they would 
‘like’ to score.  Participants then completed the 10 
serves. Three scores were attained from this task: 
Serving Estimate 1 (converted to a percentage), 
Serving Score 1 (converted to a percentage), and 
Serving Bias 1, the Bias score being the difference 
between estimated and obtained scores, where 
positive scores suggest overconfidence and negative 
scores suggest underconfidence.  
Serving task 2. Participants were required to hit 10 
first serves on a tennis court into a target area that 
measured one-eighth of the service box. The same 
procedure was followed as for Serving Task 1 except 
that participants were not allowed warm up serves. 
Three outcome measures were attained: Serving 
Estimate 2 (converted to a percentage), Serving Score 
2 (converted to a percentage), and Serving Bias 2.  
Serving task 1 retest. Serving Task 1 was repeated 
immediately after the completion of Serving Task 2, 
giving a further three measures: Serving Estimate 3, 
Serving Score 3, and Serving Bias 3.  
Serving task 2 retest. Serving Task 2 was also 
completed a second time, giving Serving Estimate 4, 
Serving Score 4, and Serving Bias 4. 
Procedure 
Ethics approval was attained from the University of 
Southern Queensland. Data were collected at regional 
tennis associations and various tennis centres across 
Brisbane. Prior to the experimental procedure, each 
participant was provided with an information sheet 
detailing the study. Parental consent was obtained for 
each participant under 18 years. Informed consent 
was held for those participants over 18 years. 
Participants were offered the chance to indicate their 
desire to receive a copy of the results of the study via 
the consent form. Immediately prior to each task, 
participants were given a verbal description of the 
task, told approximately how long it would take to 
complete the task, and that results would not be 
shared with anyone outside the experimental team. 
Participants completed the tests, the questionnaire, 
and the tasks in the order they appear above. Average 
testing time was 45 minutes. 
Results 
Six cases were identified as having missing values. 
These cases did not perform the serving tasks. This 
resulted in 64 cases completing the cognitive tasks 
and 58 cases completing the serving tasks. 
Examination of z-scores calculated from the 
skewness and kurtosis statistics indicated that the 
variables were normally distributed. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be general 
overconfidence displayed on the tennis rules test, the 
tennis general knowledge test, the tennis technique 
test, and the two serving tasks. The hypothesis was 
tested by running a repeated measures ANOVA for 
the cognitive tasks. This resulted in a 2 × 3 
(calibration: confidence rating/percentage correct; 
task: rules/general knowledge/technique) within-
subjects design. The analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between calibration and task [Wilks’ 
Lambda F(2,126) = 34.28, p < .05], indicating that 
the amount of participant overconfidence depended 
on the type of cognitive task (See Figure 1).  
 
Paired sample t-tests showed that on the rules test, 
participants were overconfident, t(63) = 9.86, p < .05. 
On the general knowledge test, participants were 
overconfident, t(63) = 7.39, p < .05. On the technique 
test, participants were well calibrated, t(63) = 1.70, p 
> .05.  
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Figure 1. Overall calibration for cognitive tasks. 
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A repeated measures ANOVA was then run on the 
serving tasks. This resulted in a 2 × 2 × 2 (calibration: 
serving estimates/serving scores; task: 1, 2; trial: 1, 2) 
within-subjects design. There were no significant 
interactions. Inspection of the main effects revealed a 
significant effect for calibration [Wilks’ Lambda 
F(1,57) = 18.33, p < .05] indicating that participants 
were overconfident across tasks.  
Hypothesis 2 stated that experts would be better 
calibrated than non-experts. To test this hypothesis, 
participants were ranked in order of expertise then 
split into expert (n = 25) and non-expert (n = 39) 
groups. An expert was defined as any current or 
former professional player and a non-expert was 
defined as any junior or social player. Repeated 
measures ANOVAs were run on each of the serving 
tasks. Results indicated that there was no effect for 
expertise on the first serving task but that an effect 
was present in the more difficult second serving task 
[Wilks’ Lambda F(1,56) = 5.1, p < .05]. Figure 2 
shows the nature of this effect on Trial 2 of  Serving 
Task 2. 
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Figure 2. Experts versus non-experts. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that feedback would improve 
calibration on the serving tasks. To test this 
hypothesis, an underconfident person was defined as 
someone whose serving estimate was lower than 
his/her serving score. An overconfident person was 
defined as someone whose serving estimate was 
higher than his/her serving score. Those who were 
underconfident on task 1 improved calibration (M = 
10.95) on the retest, t(20) = 4.26, p < .05. Those who 
were overconfident on task 1 improved calibration (M 
= 18.97) on the retest, t(28) = 4.56, p < .05. Those 
who were underconfident on task 2 did not improve 
calibration on the retest, t(13) = 1.24, p > .05. Those 
who were overconfident on task 2 improved 
calibration (M = 13.44) on the retest, t(31) = 3.70, p > 
.05. To test this hypothesis further, a count was taken 
to determine whether individuals’ calibration 
improved, declined, or stayed the same on the second 
trial. For task 1, 48.28% improved, 24.14% became 
worse, and 27.59% stayed the same between test and 
retest, indicating support for hypothesis 3. On task 2, 
little evidence of improved calibration was present, 
with 36.21% improving, 34.48% becoming worse, 
and 29.31% staying the same between test and retest. 
Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. Results of 
the rules test and the general knowledge test were in 
accord with previous research that has generally 
found overconfidence on cognitive tests (Lichtenstein 
& Fischhoff, 1977; West & Stanovich, 1997). 
However, participants were well calibrated on the 
technique test which was surprising. Participants 
scored approximately 10% more correct on the 
technique test than the other cognitive tests, but not 
only did participants know more on the technique 
test,  they also knew more about how much they 
knew. It is possible that this was due to the emphasis 
that is placed on technical elements when learning 
tennis. An average player of tournament standard 
would have been bombarded with technical 
information for many years through coaching, and 
should generally have a good understanding of how 
much they know in this area. However, little 
emphasis is placed on the rules and the history of the 
game when learning to play, therefore making these 
subjects susceptible to the same biases that some 
researchers have argued cause overconfidence in 
people who have limited knowledge on cognitive 
tasks (Kruger & Dunning, 1999).  
On the serving tasks, players were well calibrated 
on the easier task (task 1), but overconfident on the 
more difficult task (task 2 and the retest of task 2). 
Fogarty and Else (2005) and Graham (2006) also 
found that golfers were well calibrated on easier tasks 
(putting) and overconfident on more difficult tasks 
(chipping and pitching). This pattern is common in 
the cognitive field where it is known as the 
‘calibration difficulty-effect’ (Keren, 1991). It 
appears that whatever causes this difficulty-effect is 
common to both physical tasks and cognitive tasks. 
Findings relating to expertise were equivocal, 
with an effect emerging only for Serving Task 2. The 
fact that experts were better calibrated than non-
experts on the more difficult task suggests that they 
may be more familiar with aiming at a smaller target 
area when serving than non-experts. Fogarty and Else 
(2005) also failed to find an effect for expertise in 
their study of golfers. Perhaps expertise actually 
interferes with calibration by making experts overly 
confident in their judgments, especially in the case of 
easier tasks,  
The outcomes were also equivocal in relation to 
feedback. In the case of the first serving task, 
participants who were mis-calibrated on Trial 1 
tended to improve on Trial 2, but this trend was not 
evident on the more difficult second serving task. 
Fogarty and Else (2005) and Graham (2006) both 
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found that poor calibration was more likely to occur 
on difficult performance tasks in golf, and that 
feedback did not have much effect on this mis-
calibration. It appears that whatever causes the 
‘calibration difficulty-effect’ in sporting tasks also 
contributes to making it more robust and resistant to 
change. 
The findings of the current study should be treated 
with some caution. It is the first time calibration 
procedures have been applied to the sport of tennis, 
and to the best of our knowledge this is only the third 
time this technique has been used in any sport. The 
major limitation of our methodology is that 
conditions under which tennis players serve in 
competitive matches were not replicated in this study. 
Although the physical task of serving was the same as 
would occur in a match, there was no one returning 
the serve and participants were not required to finish 
the point. Calibration is important in all walks of life, 
including sport, and future research should be 
directed at methodological as well as theoretical 
issues.    
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